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Abstract 
Following the collapse of Lehman Brothers and the ensuing global credit crunch in late 
2008, Her Majesty’s Treasury (HMT) announced a large economic package to provide 
support to the UK banking sector. As part of the package, the eight largest banks committed 
themselves to raising their total Tier 1 capital by £25 billion through either private 
fundraising or government assistance. Thus, the economic package featured a new Bank 
Recapitalisation Scheme to invest up to £50 billion in capital into UK banking and credit 
institutions that could not raise their assets in the private sector. Government capital was 
invested into either ordinary or preference shares of the participating institution. As 
additional requirements of participating in the scheme, institutions had to commit 
themselves to three years of competitive lending toward homeowners and small 
businesses, allow HMT to appoint new nonexecutive directors, and withhold all 2008 
executive and board member bonuses. In 2009 alone, HMT invested approximately 
£37 billion into Lloyds Banking Group (LBG) and the Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS), where 
all invested interest was held by the government subsidiaries of UK Financial Investments, 
and later UK Government Investments. While the government remains a majority 
shareholder in RBS, it has sold off all invested interests in LBG. 
Keywords: recapitalization, capital injection, ordinary shares, preference shares, Tier 1 
capital, European Commission, United Kingdom
 
1 This case study is part of the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) selection of New Bagehot Project 
modules considering broad-based asset management company programs. Cases are available from the 
Journal of Financial Crises at  
https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-financial-crises/. 





At a Glance  
In late 2007, following a leak that 
Northern Rock had reached out to the 
Bank of England (BOE) for liquidity 
support, a run on the bank’s deposits 
ensued, leading to an emergency loan by 
the BOE. Over the subsequent months, 
Northern Rock and Her Majesty’s 
Treasury (HMT) sought to find a private 
sector solution, but ultimately ended with 
the nationalization of the company in 
February 2008. Throughout the spring, 
HMT began examining the health of all 
financial institutions and found that a 
larger systemic problem was possible. 
Following Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy 
and the resulting global credit crunch in 
September, share prices of major UK 
banks, such as the Royal Bank of Scotland 
(RBS) and Halifax Bank of Scotland (HBOS), significantly dropped and their investors and 
depositors were withdrawing funds. It became clear to the BOE, HMT, and the Financial 
Services Authority that a major recapitalization of the banking sector was required. 
Prior to the Bank Recapitalisation Scheme’s operation, the UK government received 
commitments from the eight largest banks to increase their total Tier 1 capital by £25 
billion. If a bank could not raise capital in the private sector, it was able to request capital 
assistance under the scheme. The £50 billion scheme was split into two tranches of £25 
billion, the first tranche intended for the largest banks to draw upon and the second 
tranche for smaller banks, if needed. HMT injected capital into fundamentally sound 
institutions in return for either ordinary or preference shares. Only ordinary shares 
granted voting rights to the government, while preference shares paid out a 12% annual 
interest rate until 2013 and 7% annually plus three-month Libor thereafter. Additional 
obligations of participation in the scheme required the withholding of 2008 executive and 
board member bonuses, a three-year commitment to support competitive lending to small 
businesses and homeowners, and that the government would determine dividend policies. 
On October 13, 2008, the European Commission approved the state aid package for HMT to 
recapitalize banks. The Bank Recapitalisation Scheme expired six months later, in April 
2009, with no extensions requested by the UK government. Three institutions—Lloyds TSB 
and HBOS (which merged to form Lloyds Banking Group [LBG]) and RBS—received capital 
from the scheme. The shares received were placed under the management of UK Financial 
Summary of Key Terms 
Purpose: “... to shield the economic capital of the 
banking system and to ensure that banks were 
sufficiently strongly capitalized to meet potential 
stress.” 
Announcement Date  October 8, 2008 
Approval Date October 13, 2008  
(European Commission) 
Operational Date October 13, 2008 
Expiration Date  Original: April 13, 2009 
Extended: June 30, 2013 
Program Size £50 billion in two 
tranches of £25 billion  
Usage £37.8 billion loaned to 
three domestic financial 
institutions 
UK Bank Recapitalisation Scheme 
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Investments (UKFI) for the benefit of HMT and taxpayers. In March 2018, UKFI transferred 
all government interests it held into UK Government Investments (UKGI).   
Summary Evaluation 
The Recapitalisation Scheme was considered crucial in revitalizing Lloyds-HBOS and RBS. 
However, there also were criticisms of the design of the scheme. The UK government did 
not require all major banks to participate, and this decision may have created a stigma 
against any bank that received a government capital injection. The scheme did not account 
for further drops in company share prices, leaving the value of the government shares it 
received as a fraction of the original price. Moreover, the creation of UKFI to manage the 
government’s investments and its respective goals may have been contradictory to some of 
the scheme’s goals that authorized the government to have a say over a participating 
institution’s remuneration, dividend policies, and membership of the board of directors. 
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UK Context 2009–2010 
GDP 
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU converted to USD) 
$2.424 trillion in 2009 
$2.482 trillion in 2010 
GDP per capita 
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU converted to USD) 
$38,713 in 2009 
$39,436 in 2010 
Sovereign credit rating (5-year senior debt) 
 









Size of banking system 
 
$4.730 trillion in 2009 
$4.635 trillion in 2010 
Size of banking system as a percentage of GDP 
 
195.15% in 2009 
186.72% in 2010 
Size of banking system as a percentage of financial 
system 
 
Data not available for 
2009 
Data not available for 
2010 
5-bank concentration of banking system 
 
75% in 2009 
76% in 2010 
Foreign involvement in banking system 
15% in 2009 
15% in 2010 
Government ownership of banking system 
Data not available for 
2009 
Data not available for 
2010 
Existence of deposit insurance 
100% insurance on 
deposits up to $4,000; 
90% on next $66,000 in 
2007 
100% insurance on 
deposits up to $93,000 
after October 2008  
Sources: Bloomberg; World Bank Global Financial Development Database; World Bank 








In late 2007, Northern Rock reached out to UK authorities—the Bank of England (BOE), 
Her Majesty’s Treasury (HMT), and the Financial Services Authority (FSA)—otherwise 
known as the Tripartite Authorities, for liquidity support (HMT 2007). This information 
leaked and led to a massive run on the retail deposit business, where £4.6 billion was 
withdrawn, and prompting HMT to extend an emergency loan to the bank. With no luck in 
finding a buyer, Northern Rock was nationalized by HMT in February 2008 under the 
Banking (Special Provisions) Act of 2008, which granted the government the temporary 
ability to nationalize banks (HMT 2012). 
In light of Northern Rock’s nationalization, the Tripartite Authorities undertook a full 
examination of the UK banking system, finding in the summer of 2008 that “broader 
systemic problems” were on the horizon, mostly due to solvency issues in large banks and 
building societies. On September 15, 2008, the US investment banking arm of Lehman 
Brothers filed for bankruptcy, leading to a fast deterioration of the global banking system. 
Global credit markets tightened as banks adjusted their balance sheets and contractions in 
the UK economy led to a freeze in the overall lending market. According to the BOE’s 
October 2008 Financial Stability Report, banks felt significant “funding pressure” following 
the failures of Washington Mutual and Lehman Brothers, where banks sought to deleverage 
their balance sheets rapidly, resulting in concerns over the capitalization and solvency of 
UK banks (BOE 2008). Share prices of Halifax Bank of Scotland (HBOS) and the Royal Bank 
of Scotland (RBS) fell significantly in the following weeks, while other companies sought to 
disband or merge certain business units with other banks (HMT 2012). 
Seeking to reignite lending and to provide a backstop against further losses in the banking 
sector, HMT announced an economic package on October 8, 2008, aimed at combating the 
systemic problems across the lending market and mortgage market (HMT 2008a). The 
£500 billion bailout package included a series of system-wide programs intent on 
recapitalizing banks, guaranteeing bank loans and other debt, and providing extra liquidity 
to credit institutions. At the time, the BOE’s Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) believed 
that while the announcement would boost confidence in the UK’s banking sector, the 
impacts of the Recapitalisation Scheme’s “scale and timing” were still unclear (MPC 2008). 
Program Description 
On October 12, the UK notified the European Commission (EC) of the new government 
Bank Recapitalisation Scheme, which the EC promptly approved a day later under the 
authority of Article 87(3)(b) of the EC Treaty. The overall bank support package required 
the largest UK banks and credit institutions to commit themselves to boosting their total 
Tier 1 capital by £25 billion, either by raising funds in the private sector or by requesting 
assistance from the government under the Recapitalisation Scheme (EC 2008a). 
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The scheme’s objective was to “shield the economic capital of the banking system and to 
ensure that banks are sufficiently strongly capitalized to meet potential stress.” The 
scheme, a cash facility backed by a £50 billion fund, was split into two tranches of £25 
billion, with the first tranche intended for injecting capital to the largest UK banks and the 
second tranche intended for systemically important smaller banks, if capital necessary (EC 
2008a). 
To be considered eligible to participate in the scheme, an institution had to have been 
deemed solvent and fundamentally sound by the FSA. The type of institution eligible to 
participate could have been a domestic bank, a UK-subsidiary of a foreign institution, or a 
building society. Capital injections under the scheme were in exchange for either ordinary 
or preference shares in the participating institution, with the ultimate goal of ensuring 
taxpayers were adequately compensated and that banks were motivated to repurchase 
those shares once their capital positions were strengthened. Building societies that 
participated issued permanent interest-bearing shares (PIBS) in return (EC 2008a). If the 
institution issued ordinary shares in exchange for the capital injection, the UK government 
sought the maximum discount rate of 10% on the share price. 
All preference shares issued to the UK government paid out an annual dividend of 12% for 
the first five years. Thereafter, if the UK government held any preference shares, the 
dividend payout was 7% annually, plus the three-month London Interbank Offered Rate 
(Libor). As long as preference shares existed, no dividends were paid out to ordinary 
shares. In terms of voting power, ordinary shares allowed the UK government to vote at 
any annual shareholder’s meeting of the company if dividends were not declared or paid in 
full. Preference shares did not provide shareholder voting rights (EC 2008a). 
Any participating institution had to abide by special requirements under the 
Recapitalisation Scheme (EC 2008a): 
(1) Institutions could not pay out 2008 bonus compensation for executives and 
directors. 
(2) The UK government could dismiss a board member if there was a loss of confidence 
by the rest of the board of directors. 
(3) The UK government worked with the institution to appoint new independent 
nonexecutive directors; the number of directors was based on the extent of the 
financial assistance. 
(4) Banks had to commit themselves to support lending to small businesses and 
homeowners via competitively priced loans for three years. 
(5) The UK government could review and determine the dividend policy and bonus or 
additional compensation packages of employees. 
Last, if an institution continued to benefit from the support under the Recapitalisation 
Scheme six months after the initial capital injection, it had to provide a liquidation or 
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restructuring plan to the EC. However, an institution could redeem any shares issued to the 
UK government five years after the issuance of the shares or on a quarterly dividend 
payment date, with at least one-month prior notice to the FSA for redemptions on 
preference shares (EC 2008a). The Recapitalisation Scheme was to expire in six months, on 
April 13, 2009 but was extended till October 15, 2009 (EC 2009). 
Outcomes 
Eight major banks—Abbey National, Barclays, HBOS, HSBC Bank, Lloyds TSB, Nationwide 
Building Society, RBS, and Standard Chartered—committed themselves to increasing their 
total Tier 1 capital by £25 billion (EC 2008b). Following approval from the EC on October 
13, the UK government announced capital injections in RBS, Lloyds TSB, and HBOS; Lloyds 
and HBOS were in the process of merging at the time (Darling 2008a). In November 2008, 
the UK government created UK Financial Investments (UKFI), a subsidiary of the UK 
government, to manage the UK government’s interests in any invested institutions, for the 
benefit of HMT and taxpayers, including the interest received under the Recapitalisation 
Scheme (HMT 2008c). 
RBS received £20.5 billion under the scheme, issuing £15 billion in ordinary shares and 
£5.5 billion in preference shares, resulting in a 58% stake in RBS by the UK government. 
That stake increased to 68% once the UK government converted the preference shares to 
ordinary shares in January 2009 to remove the high dividend rate that RBS had to pay 
annually. In November, due to further losses incurred and write-downs by RBS, the 
government had to once again step in to inject an additional £25.5 billion, in the form of B 
shares, which increased its stake in RBS to about 83%. The government also set aside 
£8 billion under a Contingent Capital Commitment if RBS’ Tier 1 capital ratio further 
worsened (HMT 2011a). 
While the UK government invested in Lloyds and HBOS individually in October 2008, by 
January, the government held £13 billion in ordinary shares and £4 billion in preference 
shares, equal to a 43.4% stake in Lloyds Banking Group (LBG), once the merger was 
complete. The preference shares were converted to ordinary shares in March, with no 
change in the government’s stake (HMT 2011a). 
In December 2008, the UK altered the requirement that banks had to file a restructuring or 
liquidation plan, and instead required that they submit a report that showed “that they 
remain fundamentally sound and how they plan to repay state capital (EC 2008b). The UK 
government sought multiple six-month extensions of the Recapitalisation Scheme, as well 
as the Guarantee Scheme, from the EC, until it the Recapitalisation Scheme was finally 
allowed to expire on February 20, 2010. 
By the end of 2010, the price of holding stakes in both RBS and LBG became £2.8 billion 
annually for UKFI because the share price of each company had not recovered since the 
original recapitalizations. It was not until September 2013 that UKFI began to gradually sell 
off the government’s stake in LBG. Following two accelerated book builds and two separate 
trading plans, UKFI sold off the entire government stake in LBG by May 2017. Although the 
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UK government has received net proceeds of £4.6 billion thus far from sales of its stake in 
RBS, which started in June 2015, it still remained a majority shareholder (~62.4%) in RBS, 
as of June 30, 2018 (HMT 2018). Overall, the share prices in both RBS and LBG never 
rebounded from the crisis, resulting in a permanent reduction in the share value for the 
government.  
On March 29, 2018, UKFI transferred any remaining interests it held to UK Government 
Investments (UKGI), a limited wholly owned company of HMT, which for the purposes of 
the Recapitalisation Scheme only included what remained of the UK government’s stake in 
RBS3 (UKGI 2018). 
II. Key Design Decisions 
1. The UK government announced a £500 billion bailout package, which included a 
Bank Recapitalisation Scheme. 
According to the governor of the BOE, Mervyn King, the Recapitalisation Scheme in 
conjunction with the other two programs under the bank support package—the Guarantee 
Scheme and the Special Liquidity Scheme—would greatly resolve many of the UK’s 
problems in the crisis at the time. King said, “A major recapitalisation of the UK banking 
system of at least £50 billion is a necessary condition for regenerating confidence in the 
financial system” (HMT 2008a). 
During a House of Commons debate, Chancellor of the Exchequer Alistair Darling made it 
clear that through the Recapitalisation Scheme, it was not the government’s goal to “run 
Britain’s banks—[it] want[s] to rebuild them”. Moreover, he said that to stabilize and 
rebuild the banking sector, the government would “maintain [its] stake for as long as it 
takes to do that,” with the “aim to sell the public share in the participating banks as soon as 
feasibly possible” (Darling 2008a). 
2. There is no legislation on recapitalization or on the government acquiring 
shareholder interests in a company. 
It does not appear that the UK has any specific legislation in regard to HMT’s ability to 
recapitalize banks and receive shareholder interest in companies. 
3. Under Article 87(3)(b) of the EC Treaty, EC authorized the UK the ability to inject 
capital into credit institutions.  
Given that the financial crisis led to a contracted credit market, access to liquidity became 
difficult for many financial institutions and “eroded the confidence in the creditworthiness 
 
3 Other investments included UK Asset Resolution, the holding company that held the remainder of Bradford 
& Bingley’s mortgage business and Northern Rock Asset Management’s business. The two businesses were 
runoffs from the two nationalized banks. 
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of counterparties”. Because of the role financial institutions played in lending to the real 
economy, the EC was particularly concerned that liquidity worries in the banking sector 
would spill over into the rest of the British economy as well (EC 2008a). Under Article 
87(3)(b) of the Treaty, the EC approved the Recapitalisation Scheme since it concerned the 
entire UK banking industry and the EC considered it as aid “necessary to remedy a serious 
disturbance in the British economy” (EC 2008a). 
The EC also took the scale of the measure, the timeliness of the measure, and the extent of 
the measure into consideration. The EC stated that the objective of the scheme and its 
scope to only capitalize solvent companies were adequate to revitalize the lending market. 
Its position was that capital invested in preference shares that paid high annual dividends 
incentivized institutions to redeem shares as soon as possible (EC 2008a). 
Finally, the EC noted that while a Special Liquidity Scheme had already been in place in the 
UK and the sole implementation of a guarantee scheme had been sufficient to resolve credit 
market problems in other countries like Denmark, liquidity shortages and write-downs 
might not have been completely covered by a guarantee scheme in other situations, such as 
what was occurring in the UK. Thus, the implementation of the Recapitalisation Scheme as 
an additional measure was likely to boost confidence in the UK banking system when 
working in tandem with the other programs submitted under the banking package (EC 
2008a). 
4. All of the UK government’s equity interests in credit institutions were placed 
under the management of UKFI. All UKFI interests were later transferred to 
UKGI.  
In November 2008, the UK government created UK Financial Investments to manage all UK 
government interest in individual banks or credit institutions. The overarching objective of 
UKFI was “to protect and create value for the taxpayer as shareholder, with due regard to 
financial stability and acting in a way that promotes competition”. UKFI’s board comprised 
a mix of nonexecutive private sector members, two senior government officials from HMT, 
and the shareholder executive, who managed all interests with a long-term perspective and 
independently from government supervision (HMT 2008c). 
However, in April 2016, UK Government Investments was created as another government 
subsidiary that aimed to bring together the investments, which included remaining shares 
under the Recapitalisation Scheme, and the functions of UKFI and the shareholder 
executive. All remaining interests were transferred to UKGI in May 2018, following UKFI’s 
integration into the organization (UKGI 2018).  
728
UK Bank Recapitalisation Scheme Buchholtz
 
5. Participating institutions were required to boost their total Tier 1 capital by 
£25 billion. The UK government held a £50 billion fund under the Bank 
Recapitalisation Scheme to provide capital into institutions seeking government 
assistance. 
Once HMT had announced that three banks would participate in the Recapitalisation 
Scheme, £37 billion was raised through sales of gilts and other Treasury bills, according to 
the UK Debt Management Office (DMO) (UK DMO 2008). 
6. To be eligible to participate in the Bank Recapitalisation Scheme, a bank or 
credit institution had to be sufficiently capitalized and have substantial business 
in the UK. 
A bank had to be “sufficiently capitalized” and a UK-incorporated bank, which included UK 
subsidiaries of foreign banking institutions, that had substantial business in the UK, or a 
building society. “Substantial business” in the UK meant that the bank was eligible to sign 
up for the BOE’s standing facilities according to the framework for the BOE operations in 
the sterling money markets, which meant banks with liabilities in excess of £500 million 
(EC 2008a). These liabilities included “non-interest bearing deposits and the interest 
earned from the deposits [that was] used by the Bank towards funding its operations” 
(Winters 2012). 
7. To be eligible to participate in the Bank Recapitalisation Scheme, a bank or 
credit institution must have been deemed solvent and fundamentally sound by 
the FSA. 
In a statement to the UK Parliament’s House of Commons, Chancellor Darling clarified that 
an institution had to meet certain requirements prior to being allowed to access capital 
under the Recapitalisation Scheme. The institution had to be deemed solvent by the FSA; 
“have a substantial business model and delivery plan”; demonstrate “clear, broad-based, 
and sustainable” funding and sources; and have a “senior management team [that] must be 
credible” to carry out any presented business plan (Darling 2008b). 
8. The UK government injected Tier 1 capital by investing in either ordinary or 
preference shares of the participating institutions. 
According to the EC decision, if an institution chose to raise funds via ordinary shares, the 
institution first had to undertake a placing and open offer, whereby it offered additional 
shares to existing shareholders for purchase. The UK government acted as the underwriter 
on any of these offers. Any shares that were not purchased by those existing shareholders, 
were invested in by the UK government under the Recapitalisation Scheme, where the 
government sought the “maximum permitted discount of 10% to the share price” (EC 
2008a). 
The FSA was responsible for determining how much capital was to be injected into a 
participating institution. The FSA calculated the capital assistance by using a variety of 
bank-specific stress tests, aimed at substantiating that any amount built outside confidence 
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in the bank and that the bank would have enough capital to absorb losses in the case of a 
recession, tightened banking conditions, or to continue normal lending practices. 
Moreover, the FSA aimed to ensure banks had a ratio of “capital to risk-weighted assets of 
total Tier 1 Capital of at least 8% or greater and Core Tier 1 capital … of at least 4% after 
the stressed scenario” (FSA 2008). 
9. Ordinary shares granted the UK government shareholder voting rights and was 
offered with a maximum 10% discount to the share price prior to placing an 
open offer. 
This term was also applied when converting preferred shares to ordinary shares (EC 
2008a; EC 2009).  
10. The preference shares paid an annual interest at the rate of 12% but did not 
impose dividends.  
The preference shares paid an annual interest at the rate of 12% for the first five years and 
three-month Libor plus 700 basis points thereafter (EC 2009; Panetta et al. 2009). Some 
considered this interest rate more punitive compared to the US capital injection programs 
contributing to stigma for the UK scheme (Farrell and Woll 2014; Culpepper and Reinke 
2014). 
11. UK government imposed other behavioral conditions, including limits on 
executive pay and bank activity, support for lending to homeowners and small 
businesses, and assisting mortgage workouts.  
Other conditions participating banks must follow were: 
(1) no cash bonuses to directors for the current year’s performance and where it is 
contractually owed the bonuses were to be relinquished voluntarily;  
(2) compliance with an Association of British Insurers best practice code on 
executive pay, commitment to a new FSA code on risk based remuneration at the 
nonexecutive level, and remuneration structures to be reviewed to ensure that 
incentives reflect long-term value creation and risk;  
(3) if board members lose the confidence of the board, they could be dismissed at 
reasonable and fair cost and UK authorities worked with the board on its 
appointment of new independent directors;  
(4) commitments to maintain, over the next three years, lending to homeowners and 
to small businesses, at a level at least equivalent to that of 2007; 
(5) commitments to support schemes to help people struggling with mortgage 
payments to stay in their homes, and to support the expansion of financial 
capability initiatives; and  
(6) the activity of all participating banks limited to the higher of the average 
historical growth of the balance sheets in the UK banking sector during the 
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period 1987 - 2007, or the annual rate of growth of UK nominal GDP in the 
preceding year (EC 2008a). 
12. Initially, if the UK government held any shares in a participating institution six 
months after the capital injection, the institution was required to submit a 
restructuring or liquidation plan to the European Commission. This requirement 
was later modified. 
Participating banks instead provided a report illustrating that they remain fundamentally 
sound and the plan to repay injected capital (EC 2008b).  
13. Initially, the Recapitalisation Scheme was to expire on April 13, 2009 but EC 
approved an extension through October 15, 2009. Any participating institution 
was allowed to redeem shares once the bank was stabilized with a strengthened 
capital position. 
No further information was found on this. 
III. Evaluation 
The Recapitalisation Scheme was considered crucial in revitalizing Lloyds-HBOS and RBS. 
However, there also were criticisms of the design of the scheme. In a Washington Post 
interview with Cornelia Woll, a political science professor at Sciences-Po in Paris, Woll 
pointed out that the terms of the UK Recapitalisation Scheme was more punitive than 
capital injection program in the US. Therefore, UK government sent a clear signal to the 
banks that it is less likely to take risks in the future. However, Woll points out that in the 
UK, there was a stigma to participating in the Recapitalisation Scheme, since only the 
worst-off banks would require government assistance after failing to recover through 
private sector arrangements (Farrell and Woll 2014). 
This point about stigma is critical to an analysis of the Recapitalisation Scheme used in the 
UK in comparison to the schemes created in other jurisdictions. In their analysis of capital 
injection programs in the US and UK, Culpepper and Reinke (2014) note that the UK 
allowed for voluntary participation under the scheme, while the US required all major 
banks, whether healthy or not, to participate. In the UK, the only banks that would 
volunteer were those with weak capital positions and the inability to find private sector 
assistance. A second difference they find between the US and UK programs is that the UK 
had little to no power to make regulatory or judicial threats to its largest bank since the 
largest banks’ proportion of their UK revenue to their total revenue was comparatively 
lower than the those in the US. On the other hand, revenue for the largest US banks 
depended largely on US business; thus, the government could make credible threats to 
those that did not participate under its own capital injection program. They also point out 
that this difference may have been a reason why in the US, the CEOs of the largest banks 
met with Secretary of the Treasury Hank Paulson when discussing recapitalizations, 
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whereas in the UK, banks would just send their “UK man” rather than the CEO or chairman; 
this showed a lack of independence by UK banks to cooperate with government authorities. 
Finally, Culpepper and Reinke believe that fees attached to recapitalization in UK were 
more of a drawback to participation rather than beneficial to taxpayers (Culpepper and 
Reinke 2014). 
At the time of their paper’s publishing, the authors estimated that the UK had lost 
£12 billion ($14 billion) and a book loss of £32 billion (Culpepper and Reinke 2014). For a 
summary of Culpepper and Reinke’s comparison, please see Figure 1.  
Figure 1: US vs. the UK in Capital Injection Program Designs 
Design Features of the American and British Bailout Plans 
  United States United Kingdom 
Participation in state 
recapitalizations: 
Self-selection or not? 
Design Required participation of major 
banks 
Voluntary participation of 
major banks 
Effect All nine major banks (including 
healthy banks Wells Fargo, 
JPMorgan) 
Self-selection of least resilient 








Design Low, flat, upfront fees paired 
with long-term warrants 
Steep upfront fees without 
warrants; risk-based fees for 
guarantees 
Effect Generous help for sick banks; 
tough terms for healthy and 
lucky banks 
High nominal charges for 




$8 billion–$10 billion gain from 
the Troubled Assets Relief 
Program’s bank part (excl. auto 
bailout and mortgage relief), of 
which $4 billion came from sales 
of warrants from JPMorgan, 
Wells Fargo, and Goldman Sachs 
£12 billion ($14 billion) 
currently estimated losses; 
current book loss of £32 billion 
($51 billion) from RBS, Lloyds-
HBOS 
 
Source: Culpepper and Reinke 2014. 
Dalvinder Singh, a professor at the University of Iowa College of Law, points out that one 
condition of recapitalization was that it was to allow the government to make decisions on 
retaining or inputting new members on a participating institution’s board of directors and 
install new nonexecutive directors. However, the placement of government shares into the 
UKFI was counteractive to that condition since UKFI’s powers did not include “intervening 
in day-to-day management decisions of the Investee Companies.” Thus, Singh argues that 
recapitalized banks legally maintained much more independence than the scheme dictated, 
where decisions of directors and executives would lie with the board and shareholders and 
could only be affected by UKFI through persuasion, rather than force (Singh 2011).  
732
UK Bank Recapitalisation Scheme Buchholtz
 
IV. References 




Culpepper, Pepper D., and Raphael Reinke. 2014. “Structural Power and Bank Bailouts in 
the United Kingdom and the United States.” Politics & Society 42, no. 4 (December): 427–54.  
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0032329214547342. 
Darling, Alistair. 2008a. “Commons Debate: Financial Markets.” UK House of Commons. 
Official Report, October 13, 2008, vol. 480, cols. 543–61.   
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmhansrd/cm081013/debtext/81013-
0004.htm. 
———. 2008b. “Statement by the Chancellor on the Bank Recapitalisation Scheme.” Her 
Majesty’s Treasury, November 18, 2008.   
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20090903185615/http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/statement_chx_181108.htm. 
European Commission (EC). 2008a. “Financial Support Measures to the Banking Industry in 
the UK.” State Aid N507/2008 – UK, October 13, 2008.   
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/227824/227824_881394_17_2.pdf. 
———. 2008b. “Modifications to the Financial Support Measures to the Banking Industry in 
the UK.” State Aid N650/2008 – UK, December 22, 2008.   
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/228924/228924_928084_11_2.pdf. 
———. 2009. “Prolongation of the Financial Support Measures to the Banking Industry in 
the UK.” State Aid N 193/2009 – UK, April 15, 2009.  
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/230718/230718_964179_16_2.pdf. 
Farrell, Henry, and Caroline Woll. 2014. “Interview: Bailing Out Banks Is Not a Lucrative 
Business.” Washington Post, June 24, 2014.   
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/06/24/bailing-out-
banks-is-not-a-lucrative-business/?utm_term=.c6b71bd9e41b. 
Financial Services Authority (FSA). 2008. “FSA Statement on Capital Approach Utilised in 
UK Bank Recapitalisation Package.” Press release, November 14, 2008. 
https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20081231025343/http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pa
ges/Library/Communication/Statements/2008/capapp.shtml. 
Her Majesty’s Treasury (HMT). 2007. “Liquidity Support Facility for Northern Rock plc.” 
News release, September 14, 2007.   
https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/news/2007/september/liquidity-
733








———. 2008c. “New Company to Manage Government’s Shareholding in Banks.” Press 
notice, November 3, 2008.   
https://web.archive.org/web/20120708153544/http:/webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.u
k/+/http:/www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/press_114_08.htm. 
———. 2011b. “HM Treasury Annual Report and Accounts 2010–11.” Accounts presented 
to the House of Commons pursuant to Section 6(4) of the Government Resources and 
Accounts Act 2000. London: The Stationery Office, July 14, 2011.  
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachme
nt_data/file/221559/annual_report_accounts140711.pdf. 
———. 2012. “Review of HM Treasury’s Management Response to the Financial Crisis.” 
March 29, 2012.   
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/220506
/review_fincrisis_response_290312.pdf. 




Monetary Policy Committee (MPC). 2008. “Minutes of the Special Monetary Policy 
Committee Meeting, October 8, 2008.” Bank of England, published October 22, 2008.   
https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/minutes/2008/monetary-policy-committee-october-
2008. 
Panetta, Fabio, Thomas Faeh, Giuseppe Grande, Corrinne Ho, Michael King, Aviram Levy, 
Federico M. Signoretti, Marco Taboga and Andrea Zaghin. 2009. “An Assessment of 
Financial Sector Rescue Programmes.” Banca Italia, July 2009. Number 47.  
https://www.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/qef/2009-0047/QEF_47.pdf?language_id=1. 
Singh, Dalvinder. 2011. “U.K. Approach to Financial Crisis Management.” Transnational Law 
& Contemporary Problems 19,  no. 3: 866–922.   
https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/tlcp19&id=1&collection=journals
&index=. 
UK Debt Management Office (UK DMO). 2008. “UK Bank Re-Capitalisation: Revision to 
DMO’s Financing Remit 2008-09.” Press notice, October 13, 2008.   
https://www.dmo.gov.uk/media/2176/pr131008.pdf. 
734
UK Bank Recapitalisation Scheme Buchholtz
 
UK Government Investments (UKGI). 2018. “UK Government Investments Completes 
Integration of UK Financial Investments.” Press release, March 29, 2018.   
https://www.ukgi.org.uk/2018/03/29/uk-government-investments-completes-
integration-of-uk-financial-investments/. 
Winters, Bill. 2012. “Review of the Bank of England’s Framework for Providing Liquidity to 




V. Key Program Documents 
Summary of Program 
(EC 2008a) Financial Support Measures to the Banking Industry in the UK  
State aid decision by the European Commission announcing the approval of the UK’s £500 
billion economic package to aid the UK banking sector. The package included a Guarantee 
Scheme, a Bank Recapitalisation Scheme, and a Special Liquidity Scheme.   
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/227824/227824_881394_17_2.pdf. 
Implementation Documents 
(EC 2008a) Financial Support Measures to the Banking Industry in the UK  
State aid decision by the European Commission announcing the approval of the UK’s £500 
billion economic package to aid the UK banking sector. The package included a Guarantee 
Scheme, a Bank Recapitalisation Scheme, and a Special Liquidity Scheme.   
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/227824/227824_881394_17_2.pdf. 
(EC 2008b) Modifications to the Financial Support Measures to the Banking Industry in the 
UK  
State aid decision by the European Commission announcing modifications to the October 
2008 measures taken by the UK to stabilize the financial system.   
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/228924/228924_928084_11_2.pdf. 
Press Releases/Announcements 
(Darling 2008b) Statement by the Chancellor on the Bank Recapitalisation Scheme   
 A statement by Chancellor of the Exchequer Alistair Darling on the Recapitalisation Scheme 
and the terms and conditions of participation within the scheme.  
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20090903185615/http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/statement_chx_181108.htm. 
(EC 2008c) State Aid: Commission Approves UK Support Scheme for Financial Institutions  
An announcement by the European Commission announcing the approval of the UK’s £500 
735
The Journal of Financial Crises Vol. 3 Iss. 3
 
billion economic package to aid the UK banking sector.   
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-08-1496_en.htm. 
(HMT 2008a) Treasury Statement on Financial Support to the Banking Industry  
Press release by Her Majesty’s Treasury announcing extension of an economic package to the 
UK banking sector and specifically a £50 billion Recapitalisation Scheme to strengthen the 
capital position of reeling banks.   
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/press_105_08.htm. 
(HMT 2011) Bank Intervention and Recapitalisation  
 Her Majesty’s Treasury provides an overview of the economic package and its three programs 




(Guardian 2008) Treasury’s Official Announcement on the Banks  
News story summarizing HM Treasury’s bailout support package for the UK economy and 
banking sector.   
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2008/oct/08/creditcrunch.banking1. 
(Sawyer and Whittall 2008)  UK Government Unveils £50 Billion Bank Recapitalisation Plan  
News story summarizing the £50 billion Bank Recapitalisation Scheme created by HM 
Treasury to provide capital injections into bank and credit institutions.   
https://www.risk.net/derivatives/structured-products/indexes/1501249/uk-
government-unveils-ps50-billion-bank. 
Key Academic Papers  
(Culpepper and Reinke 2014) Structural Power and Bank Bailouts in the United Kingdom 
and the United States   
Academic paper comparing bank rescue packages during the global financial crisis in US and 
UK.  
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0032329214547342. 
(Singh 2011) U.K. Approach to Financial Crisis Management  
Academic paper analyzing the measures used by UK authorities in responding to the global 




(Farrell and Woll 2014) Interview: Bailing Out Banks Is Not a Lucrative Business  
An interview with a political science professor on her then-new book about the different 
736
UK Bank Recapitalisation Scheme Buchholtz
 
approaches countries take while bailing out banks during financial crises. The interviewee 




(Morse 2009) Maintaining Financial Stability across the United Kingdom’s Banking System  
A report by the UK’s National Audit Office on how the UK had thus far responded to the 
financial crisis in the banking sector and what the cost on taxpayers was.  
https://www.nao.org.uk/report/maintaining-financial-stability-across-the-united-
kingdoms-banking-system/. 
(Winters 2012) Review of the Bank of England’s Framework for Providing Liquidity to the 
Banking System  
One of three independent reviews requested by the Court of the Bank of England in 2012, 
specifically highlighting the institutional framework for providing liquidity to banks by the 





Copyright 2018, 2021 © Yale University. All rights reserved. To order copies of this material or to 
receive permission to reprint any or all of this document, please contact the Yale Program on 
Financial Stability at ypfs@yale.edu.  
 
737
The Journal of Financial Crises Vol. 3 Iss. 3
